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Lessons from the United Stales Kent McNeil * Twenty years have passed since the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as one of the additions to the Constitution contained in the Constitution Act, 1982.' Since then, an on-going debate has ensued over the application of the Charter to Aboriginal governments. Discussions of this issue usually centre on two questions, one legal and the other normative: first, does the Charter apply to Aboriginal governments as a matter of Canadian constitutional law, and second, should the Charter apply to Aboriginal governments?
These questions obviously beg a preliminary question of what is meant by "Aboriginal governments." In an earlier article,' I identified three categories of Aboriginal governments that need to be considered in this context: (1) traditional Aboriginal governments, defined as "Indian, Inuit, and Mdtis governments which do not have a statutory or explicit constitutional base, but which exist or could be constituted by Aboriginal peoples as expressions of their inherent right of self-government ;,,3 (2) Indian Act' band council governments ; and (3) other forms of Aboriginal government, arising out of land claims agreements or statutory provisions.' To these should now be added the Nunavut Government, a territorial government created by federal statute, 6 like those of the Yukon and the I would like to thank Lorraine Land for her indispensable assistance with the research for this article. Special thanks are also due to John Borrows, Lana Finney, and Stepan Wood. The financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is also gratefully acknowledged. Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, (U.K.) 1982, c. 11. K. McNeil, "Aboriginal Governments and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1996) Ibid. at 63-64 in Emerging Justice? at 217. Self-Government Act, S.C. 1986, c. 27 . A more recent example can be found in the Nisga'a Final Agreement, initialed August 4, 1998. Chapter 2, para. 9, of this Agreement provides : "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to Nisga'a Government in respect of all matters within its authority, bearing in mind the free and democratic nature of Nisga'a Government as set out in this application of civil rights guarantees to tribal governments, and see whether there is anything we in Canada can learn from that experience.'°T
ribal Governments and Civil Rights in the United States
Indian Sovereignty and the American Constitution Ever since the decisions of Chief Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia" and Worcester v. Georgia1 2 in the early 1830s, Indian tribes in the United States have been regarded in American law as quasi-independent nations. While their original sovereignty was diminished by European colonization and their inclusion within the boundaries of the United States, they retained authority over their own territories and internal affairs. This authority does not depend on any delegation of jurisdiction from the United States; instead, it is derived from the tribes' "inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished. 13 This residual sovereignty is nonetheless subject to the plenary power of Congress over the Indian tribes, which can be used to diminish their authority. 4 But to the extent that tribal sovereignty is not inconsistent with the tribes' incorporation into the United States and has not been limited by Congress, tribal governments can continue to exercise the inherent sovereignty of the Indian nations. 5 Given that Indian sovereignty pre-dates the formation of the United States and entails inherent rather than delegated authority, tribal governments are outside the scope of the American Constitution. As a consequence, tribal governments are not subject to the civil rights guarantees 1o With the exception of Schwartz, supra note 9, Canadian commentators generally have not sought guidance from the American experience in this context. While Russell, supra note 9, does draw very useful insights from American law, he does not go into the application of civil rights guarantees to tribal governments. 1 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 12 Congressional power over the Indian tribes comes from the U.S. Constitution, especially art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which authorizes Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Although this power is said to be "plenary", it is subject to constitutional limits and the federal trust responsibility owed to the Indian tribes: see F.S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 1982 contained in the Bill of Rights Amendments to the Constitution. In Talton v. Mayes, ' 6 this issue arose in the context of the grand jury requirement in the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court decided that this requirement does not apply to a tribal court exercising criminal jurisdiction under the laws of the Cherokee Nation. In the words of the Supreme Court, ... the existence of the right in Congress to regulate the manner in which the local powers of the Cherokee nation shall be exercised does not render such local powers Federal powers arising from and created by the Constitution of the United States. It follows that as the powers of local self government enjoyed by the Cherokee nation existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the Fifth Amendment.1 7
The Talton decision had far-reaching effect, for it "meant that such constitutional guarantees as free speech, the free exercise of religion, the right to an attorney in a criminal case, and similar benefits were not available to American Indians [in their relations with their own tribal governments] unless specifically provided for in a tribal code or In tribal courts, AngloAmerican due process protections -such as rights to legal counsel, to remain silent, to trial by jury, and to appeal -were often lacking. 37 While cultural differences provided a partial explanation why tribal governments and courts operated in accordance with norms different from those of the rest of 29 D.L. Burnett, Jr., "An Historical Analysis of the 1968 'Indian Civil Rights' Act" (1972) 9
Harv. J. on Leg'n 557 at 575. 30 Whether Indians generally were in a position to make use of these protections is another matter. American society, practical considerations were also important, at least for tribal courts. In particular, given their limited resources many tribal justice systems could not afford legally-trained personnel, jury trials, or appeal judges. 38 The general counsel for the Warm Springs Confederation, one of the larger, more affluent tribes, testified that, without financial assistance, "imposition upon the tribal courts of all the requirements of due process as we non-Indians know them, would mean the end of our tribal courts.
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Tribal councils, however, were accused by some witnesses of violations of fundamental rights, such as freedom of religion, that did not stem from financial constraints. n° But testimony also revealed that some of the problems resulted from failure by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to respect due process requirements on reservations. According to Donald Burnett, Jr., [t] he thrust of the testimony was that the BIA was less interested in the adequacy of law enforcement on the reservations and in the constitutional rights of the people for whom it was responsible than in maintaining control over tribal courts and councils and over the affairs of individuals. The attitude was neatly expressed, said the Shoshone-Bannock attorney, in a remark attributed to a BIA employee at Fort Hall : "We didn't have any trouble with the Indians until they found out they had constitutional rights. ' Al In proposing legislation to Congress to remedy the problems which the hearings had revealed, Senator Ervin nonetheless decided to concentrate on violations of civil rights by tribal authorities. 42 He acknowledged that these violations occur, "not from malice or ill will, or from a desire to do injustice, but from the tribal judges' inexperience, lack of training, and unfamiliarity with the traditions and forms of the American legal system., 43 He offered the following rationale for a legislative solution : "It is, of course, preferable that the tribes themselves assure basic rights to each member, but when this is not the case it is incumbent upon Congress to take action." 44 
Provisions and Expressed Concerns
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) replicates most of the American Bill of Rights and the equal protection and due process aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment, with certain exceptions to be discussed below. 4 The relevant provisions are in § § 1302-1303,4 9 which need to be reproduced in full: § 1302. Constitutional Rights No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall: (1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances; (2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized; (3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy; (4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; (5) take any private property for a public use without just compensation; (6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have 46 On the tactics of enactment, see Burnett, supra note 29 at 604-14. 47 82 Stat. 77. 48 The relevant provisions are contained in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Titles In to VII deal with other Indian matters that are beyond the scope of this article, including the drafting of a model code for Courts of Indian Offenses, limitations on state jurisdiction over Indian reservations, the addition of assault resulting in serious bodily injury to the major crimes committed by reservation Indians over which the federal courts have jurisdiction, federal government approval of employment of legal counsel by Indians, and revision and publication of certain works relating to Indian affairs, including Cohen's Handbook (1st ed. 1942), supra note 14. 49 § 1301 is an interpretive section containing the following definitions:
(1) "Indian tribe" means any tribe, band, or other group of Indians subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and recognized as possessing powers of self-government ; (2) "powers of self-government" means and includes all governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are executed, including courts of Indian offenses ; and (3) "Indian Court" means any Indian tribal court or court of Indian offense. In 1990 and 1991, § 1301(2) was amended to include "the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians" : Pub. L. Sixth Amendment, exercise of the right to counsel in criminal proceedings was made to be at the expense of the accused so that the limited financial resources of the tribes would not be strained." Finally, the right to a jury trial was limited to offenses punishable by imprisonment. 5 6 Rather than simply applying the American Bill of Rights to the Indian tribes, Congress thus made some attempt to acknowledge and take account of their unique circumstances.
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Application of even this modified version of the Bill of Rights was nonetheless opposed by some Indian tribes, especially the Pueblos in the Southwest. A 1991 report of the United States Commission on Human Rights, based on a five-year study of the enforcement of the ICRA, 59 summarized some of their objections:
Among the general concerns raised were that the ICRA was an infringement on tribal right to self-government, that implementation of the ICRA's requirements would diminish or eliminate tribal customs and traditions, that the ICRA was unnecessary in light of similar guarantees and traditions in tribal law; and concern about where the funding for these new guarantees was to come from in light of the tribes' meager resources. Some of the arguments against inclusion of a right to trial by jury, especially in civil matters, included cost, the difficulty of finding impartial jurors in small communities, and the inappropriateness of this form of trial in societies where kinship predominates : Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 55 at 9. During the Congressional hearings on the legislation, Domingo Montoya, Chairman of the All Indian Pueblo Council of New Mexico, said this : "it [was] no more logical to use a jury system for the settlement of internal matters within the extended 'family' that makes up a pueblo than it would be to use a similar system within the framework of an Anglo-American family as a means for enforcing internal rules or resolving internal disputes" : Rights agency to investigate allegations of discriminatory denial of the right to vote, collect information and study legal developments in relation to discrimination and equal protection, appraise federal laws and policies regarding discrimination and equal protection, and submit reports and recommendations to Congress and the President :Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 55, inside front cover. 59 The sources of information for the Report are described thus : "At the core of the study were hearings in five locations in which testimony was received from scores of individuals including, among others, tribal judges, tribal council members, Indian law scholars, tribal lay advocates, United States Attorneys, attorneys who practice before tribal courts, representatives of tribal judges associations, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Information was also gathered through field interviews, staff research, oral and written correspondence, statements submitted by tribes, and responses to Commission requests for information. In all, 162 persons provided testimony, and hundreds of others were interviewed." Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 55 at 1-2 [footnotes omitted]. 60 Ibid. at 8 [footnotes omitted]. The financial concerns appear to have been well founded:
see ibid. at 37-44, 71-72 (Findings 2, 4 and 5). Maria Odum, in an article in the New York Some more specific concerns were that elections based on the principle of one person, one vote, were incompatible with the political structures of some Indian tribes, that allowing actions to be brought in federal courts would undermine the authority of tribal courts and weaken community unity, and that the sentencing limits could interfere with tribal efforts to maintain order. 6 '
Another example of how the Act could have a negative impact on tribal traditions and customs was given by John S. Boyden on behalf of the Ute and Hopi Tribes. In reference to the prohibition against compulsory selfincrimination, he said this:
The defendants' standard of integrity in many Indian courts is much higher than in the State and Federal Courts of the United States. When requested to enter a plea to a charge the Indian defendant, standing before respected tribal judicial leaders, with complete candor usually discloses the facts. With mutual honesty and through the dictates of experience, the Indian judge often takes a statement of innocence at face value, discharging the defendant who has indeed, according to tribal custom, been placed in jeopardy. The same Indian defendants in off-reservation courts soon learn to play the game of "white man's justice," guilty persons entering pleas of not guilty merely to throw the burden of proof upon the prosecution. From their viewpoint, it is not an elevating experience. We are indeed fearful that the decisions of Federal and State Courts, in light of non-Indian experience, interpreting "testifying against oneself' would stultify an honorable Indian practice.
More generally, imposition of the due process requirements of an adversarial system of justice could undermine tribal traditions.
6 3 A number of years after the enactment of the ICRA, Chief Justice Tom Tso of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court wrote of the adjustments necessary for his Nation to conform to Anglo-American standards of due process :
Times on 4 October 1991 entitled "Money Shortage Seen as Hindering Indian Justice", wrote : "Indian judges charge that Congress left them with an impossible task when it established standards for their legal system without providing money to help the courts move toward something more like the adversarial system found in state and Federal courts." Congress has recognized this problem. The Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 103-176, 107 Stat. (1993 See Nations Within, supra note 23 at 213, suggesting that the rights-based approach of the ICRA would replace the complex systems of responsibilities and duties that are fundamental to traditional Indian societies.
For the Navajo people, dispute settlement required the participation of the community elders and all those who either knew the parties or were familiar with the history of the problem. Everyone was permitted to speak. Private discussions with an elder who could resolve a problem was also acceptable. It was difficult for Navajos to participate in a system where fairness required the judge to have no prior knowledge of the case, and where who can speak and what they can say are closely regulated.
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Concern was also expressed over the appropriateness of Congressional imposition of civil rights guarantees on all the Indian tribes without their consent. At the Senate Hearings prior to enactment of the ICRA, Arthur Lazarus, Jr., General Council of the Association of American Indian Affairs, said this :
Perhaps the major problem ... is the attempt in this legislation to impose upon all Indian communities at one fell swoop a sophisticated legal system that has been developing in our society over a period of centuries. I suggest that Indian tribes vary -each having different resources, customs, size, degree of education or assimilation, etc. -and that the proposed establishment of one set of legal rules for all tribes is unworkable and unwise. I further suggest that it is not realistic to expect Indians (or any other nation) to learn respect for our constitutional principles when their application is required by legislative direction from outside and does not grow out of the actual operations of tribal government.
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The crux of the debate over the ICRA, both before and after its enactment, has thus been tension between the application to Indian governments of the Anglo-American approach to protection of individual rights and freedoms on the one hand, and respect for Indian sovereignty and tribal traditions on the other. 66 While the legislative history and the provisions of the Act itself reveal that Senator Ervin and Congress did attempt to achieve some balance between these different values, the extent to of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Congress, 1st Sess. 1 (1965) at 65, as quoted in G.K. Reiblich, "Indian Rights Under the Civil Rights Act of 1968" (1968) 10 Ariz. L. Rev. 617 at 620 n.11. See also Chaudhuri, supra note 20 at 30 : "Students of the law are keenly aware that the nationalization of the Bill of Rights and its application to the states has a complex history and one that is still in process. However, at least the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified by the states. No such ratification was sought from the tribes in the context of the Indian Civil Rights Act. The 'rights' were extended unilaterally by Congress thereby again raising many questions of the role and meaning of 'consent' in democratic theory. which they succeeded has been hotly debated. 67 The ideological controversy has since been fueled by judicial interpretation of the statute. The Martinez case involved an application to the United States District Court by Julia Martinez, a member of the Santa Clara Pueblo in New Mexico, and her daughter Audrey Martinez, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated individuals, alleging that a 1939 Pueblo Ordinance violated the equal protection provision in § 1302(8) of the ICRA. The Ordinance granted membership in the Pueblo to children whose fathers were members and mothers were non-members, but denied it to children whose mothers were members and fathers were non-members. As Martinez had married a Navajo man, the Ordinance excluded their children from membership in the Pueblo. This exclusion meant that the children were denied, among other things, the right to live in the community after their mother's death, to inherit her land rights, to vote in Pueblo elections, and to hold secular office in the Pueblo. The District Court dismissed a motion challenging the Court's jurisdiction to decide the matter, but went on to find for the Pueblo on the merits. 73 While acknowledging the vital importance of the applicants' interests, Mechem D.J. held that the equal protection guarantee in the ICRA ... should not be construed in a manner which would require or authorize this Court to determine which traditional values will promote cultural survival and therefore should be preserved and which of them are inimical to cultural survival and should therefore be abrogated. Such a determination should be made by the people of Santa Clara; not only because they can best decide what values are important, but also because they must live with the decision every day.
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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's decision that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the application of the ICRA to tribal governments, but reversed on the merits.
7
" While agreeing that the equal protection provision in the ICRA should not necessarily be interpreted and applied in the same way as the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Tenth Circuit decided that the Pueblo's interest in the Ordinance, especially given its relatively recent enactment, was not compelling enough to justify the sexual discrimination inherent in it.
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The Supreme Court reversed again, this time on the jurisdictional issue.
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Justice Thurgood Marshall, delivering the opinion of the Court, started his analysis of this issue by reaffirming that the "Indian tribes are 'distinct, independent, political communities, retaining their original natural rights' in matters of local self-government."
78 He then reiterated the position adopted in Talton therefore, was whether Congress had intended to limit the tribes' sovereign immunity from suit. The Supreme Court's answer to this question was no. Any waiver of sovereign immunity, Marshall J. said, "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." 2 As nothing in the ICRA purported to subject tribes to the jurisdiction of federal courts in civil actions, 3 he concluded that the tribes' sovereign immunity protected them from federal court actions for violation of the Act. 84 But as the sovereign immunity of the Santa Clara Pueblo did not extend to its Governor, who had also been named as a defendant in the action, Marshall J. also found it necessary to determine whether the ICRA implicitly empowered federal courts to adjudicate on allegations of violation of the Act by tribal officers.
The Court answered this second question in the negative as well. Marshall J. expressed a number of concerns that influenced this part of the Court's decision. He pointed out that the Supreme Court had shown reluctance in the past to submit even matters of commercial and domestic relations on Indian reservations to an outside forum, as that might infringe the right of self-government and undermine tribal courts.
8 1 "A fortiori," he said, "resolution in a foreign forum of intratribal disputes of a more 'public' character, such as the one in this case, cannot help but unsettle a tribal government's ability to maintain authority." 6 He noted as well that the provisions of the ICRA manifested "[t]wo distinct and competing purposes ... In addition to its objective of strengthening the position of individual tribal members vis-4-vis the tribe, Congress also intended to promote the well-established federal 'policy of furthering Indian self-government.' '8 He found evidence for the latter intention in the fact that the ICRA had "selectively incorporated and in some instances modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit the unique political, cultural, and economic needs of the tribal governments. 88 burdens on already 'financially disadvantaged' tribes." 9 Finally, Marshall J. found that, apart from habeas corpus for which express provision had been made by § 1303, there was no need for federal court jurisdiction, as tribal courts provided an appropriate forum for bringing complaints of violations of the ICRA. 90 The legislative history behind the Act revealed that, after consideration of various options for federal court review of tribal criminal proceedings, a conscious decision had been made to limit judicial review to habeas corpus, as that "would adequately protect the individual interests at stake while avoiding unnecessary intrusions on tribal governments."
9 ' Other proposals for federal review of tribal actions involving civil matters were also rejected. Marshall J. accordingly concluded:
These factors, together with Congress' rejection of proposals that clearly would have authorized causes of action other than habeas corpus, persuade us that Congress, aware of the intrusive effect of federal judicial review upon tribal self-government, intended to create only a limited mechanism for such review, namely, that provided for expressly in § 1303 ... By not exposing tribal officials to the full array of federal remedies available to redress actions of federal and state officials, Congress may also have considered that resolution of statutory issues under § 1302, and particularly those issues likely to arise in a civil context, will frequently depend on questions of tribal tradition and custom which tribal forums may be in a better position to evaluate than federal courts ... As suggested by the District Court's opinion in this case, ... efforts by the federal judiciary to apply the statutory prohibitions of § 1302 in a civil context may substantially interfere with a tribe's ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity.
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As the jurisdictional issue decided in Martinez has not been re-visited by the Supreme Court, the decision is still the leading case on the ICRA. Attempts have been made in Congress to reverse the impact of the decision by amending the ICRA to restrict the sovereign immunity of the Indian tribes and to give the federal courts broader jurisdiction to enforce the Act, but these initiatives have failed. 93 was delivered, the Martinez decision still generates controversy in both political and legal circles.
Critical Assessment
The Martinez case exemplifies the efforts the courts of the United States have made to interpret the ICRA so as to strike a balance between the protection of individual civil rights and maintenance of Indian sovereignty and traditions. The District Court and the Tenth Circuit both assumed jurisdiction, but tried to apply the Act in a way that would be sensitive to the traditions of the Santa Clara Pueblo. 94 As we have seen, they came to different conclusions on the merits, indicating how difficult it can be for judges who are outsiders to adjudicate on matters that involve assessments of the culture of an Indian nation. 95 The Supreme Court avoided making such an assessment by denying jurisdiction to the federal courts, except where a writ of habeas corpus is sought.' This meant that the only forum available to Julia and Audrey Martinez for a remedy for their complaint was within the Santa Clara Pueblo. 97 Given that the judicial authority of the Pueblo was vested in the Tribal Council, 98 their chances of obtaining a remedy were therefore nil. 99 The fact that the decision effectively left Julia and Audrey Martinez without a remedy for the gender discrimination they experienced has troubled many commentators. Martinez to be "a difficult case on a lot of levels.' ' . 1 She acknowledged that it "poses difficult tensions, even conflicts, between equality of the sexes, on the one hand, and the need to approach those questions within their particular cultural meanings, in an awareness of history and out of respect for cultural diversity and the need for cultural survival, on the other."' 0 2 By "word of mouth," she had learned that the Santa Clara Ordinance was a response to threats to Pueblo land caused by the 1887 General Allotment Act, 1 0 3 rather than an outgrowth of tribal tradition."° MacKinnon accordingly concluded that the Ordinance was a "male supremacist solution to a problem male supremacy created."' 0 5 She suggested that "cultural survival is as contingent upon equality between women and men as it is upon equality among peoples,"' 0 6 but did not propose any means for achieving gender equality within Indian tribes without federal court enforcement of the ICRA's equal protection provision. The almost inevitable response is "how tragic" and "how absurd" that white society should seek to impose such values on Indian people. We think, "What fools were these nineteenth century men who did not see that cultural values differ from group to group." How quaintly dated, how Victorian, we muse. And yet, when we look at the present day era we find, for example, much of this same attitude emerging in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.3 Vine Deloria and Clifford Lytle were more specific:
The real impact of the Indian Civil Rights Act ... was to require one aspect of tribal government -the tribal court -to become a formal institution more completely resembling the federal judiciary than the tribal government itself resembled either the state or federal governments. The informality of Indian life that had been the repository of cultural traditions and customs was suddenly abolished, and in its place came the rigid requirements that were necessary to identify those instances in which the actions of the tribal government impinged upon the rights of tribal members. 114 110 Despite the title of her article, however, Christofferson offered virtually no evidence that tribal courts were not protecting the equality rights of female tribal members, as the equal protection provision in the ICRA requires them to do. She seems to have assumed that, because Julia and Audrey Martinez could not obtain a remedy within the Santa Clara Pueblo, other Indian women would be similarly disadvantaged. However, examination of the reported decisions of tribal courts concerning the ICRA has revealed that they are doing a reasonably good job enforcing its provisions :see infra notes 142-52 and accompanying text. If the Indian nations did not submit to the constitutional norms and procedural standards of American society, they risked losing even more of the limited sovereignty that they had been able to retain.
Professor Robert Laurence, a self-described "tribal advocate,"' 5 thought that the Martinez decision itself was responsible for an erosion of tribal sovereignty. The "great irony" of the decision, he wrote, is that it "honored tribal sovereignty so much that it threatens to destroy it.""1 6 Laurence saw a connection between Martinez and Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, " 7 decided in the period between the argument and decision in Martinez. In Oliphant, the Supreme Court held that tribal courts do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians."' This was the first of a series of decisions in which the Supreme Court has systematically narrowed the jurisdiction of Indian tribes over non-members, first in criminal". 9 and there is a "definite trend by tribal courts" toward the view that they "ha[ve] leeway in interpreting" the ICRA's due process and equal protection clauses and "need not follow the U.S. Supreme Court precedents 'jot-for-jot."' In any event, a presumption against tribal-court civil jurisdiction squares with one of the principal policy considerations underlying Oliphant, namely, an overriding concern that citizens who are not tribal members be "protected ... from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty," [Oliphant] at 210.124 Souter J. went on to observe that tribal courts differ as well in their structures, the laws they apply, and "the independence of their judges. 125 Moreover, even when tribal court decisions involve non-tribal law they cannot be appealed to state or federal courts. Justice Souter concluded : "The result, of course, is a risk of substantial disuniformity in the interpretation of state and federal law, a risk underscored by the fact that "[tiribal courts are often 'subordinate to the political branches of tribal governments. ',,' 26 Souter J.'s message is clear: tribal courts cannot be trusted to protect the civil rights of non-members.
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As a major criticism of the Martinez decision has been that the remedies available for enforcement of the ICRA within Indian tribes are inadequate, it is important to assess whether this is actually true. At the time of the decision in 1978, it appears that many tribes did not have their own courts where remedies could be sought, though this problem has been alleviated by rapid expansion of tribal court systems since Martinez.' 28 Where tribal courts are in place, complaints have been made that they lack the judicial Ten years later, the number had increased to about 150, handling an estimated 230,000 cases annually. The growth of tribal judiciaries in the most recent decade has been astounding. Today, of the more than 500 federally recognized tribal governments, virtually all have some system of civil dispute resolution and most have criminal court systems." independence necessary to make impartial decisions when violations of the ICRA by tribal governments are alleged. 2 9 In their 1991 Report on the ICRA, the United States Commission on Civil Rights acknowledged this to be a problem in some tribes; however, in their view the solution was not federal court review, but increased funding for tribal courts, education of tribal councillors on the role of the judiciary and the importance of judicial independence, and intertribal appellate systems.13 0 They wrote:
The Commission believes that respect for tribal sovereignty requires that prior to any further intrusion by the Federal Government into tribal justice systems, such as by way of imposing Federal court review, tribal forums be first given the opportunity to institute proper mechanisms that would operate with adequate resources, training, funding, and support from the Federal Government. Because of the great diversity of customs, traditions, resources, and even size, among tribes, the solutions they adopt will necessarily vary. 131
The sovereign immunity of the Indian tribes, which was upheld by the Supreme Court's decision in Martinez that the ICRA did not implicitly take that immunity away where a federal court action was brought for violation of the Act, has also been regarded as problematic. While some tribes have statutorily waived their sovereign immunity in some instances, others have not.
132 Some tribal court judges have interpreted the Martinez decision as permitting suit against tribal governments in tribal courts, but other tribal court judges have disagreed.
3 3 The problem, of course, is that the ICRA is little more than a statement of principle insofar as violations of civil rights by tribal governments are concerned if they can hide behind their sovereign immunity. On the other hand, financially-pressed tribes fear that exposure to civil damage claims might threaten their viability. Recognizing the seriousness of this problem, the United States Commission on Civil Rights recommended that the Federal Government provide funds "for the establishment of several pilot projects to assist tribal governments in an exploration of the extent to which they might enact statutory waivers of sovereign immunity to allow civil rights suits against the tribe, without jeopardizing the tribal government's viability.' 3 4 Otherwise, the Commission saw a risk that Congress or the Supreme Court would impose a solution that would be detrimental to tribal sovereignty.
135 In response to this problem, many tribes have in fact waived their sovereign immunity in civil rights cases, at least to the extent of allowing injunctive or declaratory relief. 136 Sovereign immunity apart, evidence has been accumulating that the tribal courts are doing a reasonably good job enforcing the provisions of the ICRA. In its 1991 Report, the United States Commission on Civil Rights found that, while a lack of judicial independence has hampered application of the Act by some tribal courts, inadequate federal funding of tribal court systems is a more serious problem. The Commission observed that, in enacting the statute, Congress "did not fully take into account the practical application of many of the ICRA's provisions to a broad and diverse spectrum of tribal governments, and that it required these procedural protections of tribal governments without providing the means and resources for their implementation."' 37 They concluded:
The failure of the United States Government to provide proper funding for the operation of tribal judicial systems, particularly in light of the imposed requirements of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, has continued for more than 20 years. Funding for tribal judicial systems may be further hampered in some instances by the pressures of competing priorities within a tribe. 1 38 In their recommendations, the Commissioners strongly encouraged Congress to live up to the trust obligations of the Federal Government by providing more funding to strengthen tribal governments and courts. 3 9 Instead of imposing further restrictions on tribal sovereignty by amending the ICRA to provide for federal judicial review, the Commissioners were of the view that ''respect for tribal sovereignty requires that prior to considering such an imposition, Congress should afford tribal forums the opportunity to operate with adequate resources, training, funding, and guidance, something they have lacked since the inception of the ICRA."' 4 More recent assessments of tribal court enforcement of the ICRA have also concluded that the most serious problem with tribal court systems is inadequate funding. Robert McCarthy surveyed the reported tribal court decisions involving the ICRA in the thirty-year period up to 1998.141 He observed:
Tribal court criticism seems to be based to a large extent on anecdotal evidence, since there has been virtually no scholarship dealing with 135 Civil Rights Commission Report, supra note 55 at 67, citing S. Laffery, "Sovereignty:
Tribal Sovereign Immunity and the Claims of NonIndians Under the Indian Civil Rights Act" (1981) actual construction of the ICRA by tribal courts. Yet an analysis of published tribal court opinions suggests that despite serious financial constraints, tribal courts have been no less protective of civil rights than have federal courts. With unique cultural perspectives, tribal courts appear to have looked to federal precedent as well as tribal traditions to discern the essential fairness implied by the requirement of due process. There is an inherent risk in relying on self-selected case reports as a barometer of due process in tribal courts, and the number of reported decisions is relatively few. Nonetheless, with those caveats, tribal courts appear to be no less protective -and much more accessible -than federal courts have been in protecting civil rights on Indian reservations.
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McCarthy noted that most tribal members are too poor to avail themselves of the ICRA's right to counsel. For him, this is a much greater barrier to justice than lack of access to federal courts, as bringing suit in federal court would not be a realistic option for the average tribal member. He concluded:
Any proposal which truly values extension of civil rights to tribal members must recognize the need for increased tribal court advocacy. Judges do not generally raise ICRA claims on their own initiative. As important as a trained and well-funded judiciary is to effective implementation of the ICRA, real progress requires real guarantees of equal access to the courts. Effective implementation of the ICRA depends not so much on federal courts located far from poor reservation communities, more so on well-trained and financed tribal courts, but mostly on an Indian civil rights movement in which low income Native Americans have equal access to justice in tribal courts, in traditional peacemaking practices, and in the larger society. 14 1
Professor Nell Newton studied the 85 tribal court decisions published in the Indian Law Reporter in 1996, of which 22 cases raised civil rights issues.' 44 She found that the tribal court had agreed with the party making the civil rights claim in 11 of those cases. Moreover, non-Indians had been either plaintiffs or defendants in 18 of the 85 cases studied, and were probably parties in 19 others. Newton observed that "these non-Indian parties were treated fairly."' 14 5 One instance occurred in Simplot v. Ho-Chunk Nation Department of Health," where the Ho-Chunk Tribal Court found that the non-Indian plaintiffs had been denied the due process they were entitled to under the ICRA when their employment was terminated by the defendant, and ordered that they be reinstated and paid damages. 147 Newton concluded:
142 . See also at 513 :"The evidence suggests that efforts to strip tribes of sovereign immunity or to greatly expand federal review of tribal courts are overbroad remedies for an exaggerated problem, unfairly based on anecdote and cultural prejudice." Accord R.D. Probasco, "Indian Tribes, Civil Rights, and Federal Courts" (2001) As demonstrated through this relatively small sample of tribal court cases, the tribal courts, although forced to engraft Western legal principles onto their consensual form of decision making, have been highly successful in doing so. In part, this is because they are sensitive to the potential loss of their independent adjudicatory systems if they were to overstep the boundaries placed upon them by the Congress and the courts, and in part because they have had to become adept at melding the traditions and customs of their cultures with those legal principles guiding the majority culture. Unlike their critics, tribal courts do not dismiss well-reasoned opinions of the majority culture's courts but choose, instead, to use these Western principles with their own customary and traditional norms.148
Professor Newton thought that tribal court opinions need to be reported more extensively and distributed more widely so they are more available to other judges, legislators, scholars, and majority and minority communities. This would "erve to eradicate misconceptions," she wrote, and might "allow for a critical dialogue with these opinions without eradication of the courts themselves."' 49 An even more extensive examination and analysis of case law involving the ICRA was published in 2000 by Professor Mark Rosen.
5° Like Robert McCarthy and Nell Newton, he found that the evidence did not reveal a need for the expanded federal court jurisdiction or curtailed tribal court jurisdiction proposed by some commentators and members of Congress. He found as well that these proposals were based on concerns arising from anecdote rather than detailed evaluation of the available empirical evidence: whether the principles that guide our inquiry into the "criminal" or "civil" nature of the tribal action in this case or the severity of the restraint imposed must be "culturally defined" by the tribe, or whether we can approach these questions guided by general American legal norms or certain universal principles.
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After a brief discussion of this essential question, he gave a categorical response :
In sum, there is simply no room in our constitutional order for the definition of basic rights on the basis of cultural affiliations, even with respect to those communities whose distinctive "sovereignty" our country has long recognized and sustained.
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While not all federal judges have taken such a rigid approach, Professor Rosen pointed out that there is still a tendency on the part of federal courts to permit variation from federal doctrines ... only when the Indian practice being challenged "differ [s] significantly from those 'commonly employed in Anglo-Saxon society."' But when tribes adopt procedures akin to those found in general society, these courts have held, the tribes are subject to the ordinary federal requirements imposed by due process, equal protection, and so forth.
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The thorny question of what counts as "tradition" obviously figures prominently in this kind of superficially balanced approach. Our discussion of the commentary on the Martinez decision and the assessments that have been made of tribal court enforcement of the ICRA reveal the complexity of the issues and the range of opinions on how to achieve an appropriate balance between civil rights and Indian sovereignty and traditions. Fortunately, for the purposes of this article it is not necessary to try to resolve the controversies that the ICRA and the Martinez decision have provoked. Instead, my goal is to attempt to identify lessons that we in Canada can learn from the American experience that will assist us in determining whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms should apply to traditional Aboriginal governments. For while recognizing that the historical and constitutional contexts are quite different in our two countries, I nonetheless think that the fundamental issues are remarkably similar. In the 1960s, American policy-makers grappled with the fact that the Bill of Rights does not apply to the Indian nations as a matter of constitutional law. Before any decision was made by Congress to deal with the situation, extensive hearings were conducted by Senator Sam Ervin's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, beginning in 1961. The legislation he proposed was revised in important respects before its eventual enactment as the ICRA in 1968, in part to take account of concerns expressed by some of the Indian nations. 62 As we have seen, the provisions in § 1302 of the Act are modelled on, but do not mirror, the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. One of the most serious concerns is the lack of substantive discussion about the problems created when Aboriginal communities' collective values conflict with the individualistic norms imposed by the Charter ... The commission indicated that it had heard various Aboriginal leaders from across the country, many of whom had indicated a concern about the implications of the Charter for their collective rights. Seemingly, these concerns had little impact on the commissioners. There is no discussion in the report about how Aboriginal values concerning clan mother elections are threatened by the democratic rights reflected in Section 3 of the Charter. No mention is made of the damage that threatens a community's values when an individual is insulated from having to speak on his or her own behalf in court.
Charter's double-jeopardy clause, which would deny the community the ability to deal in a culturally significant way with an offender. Plainly, none of these issues appears to have been considered by the commission. If they were, the report itself is entirely silent on these matters. '
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Unlike the Commission, Russell engaged in a detailed analysis of the possible effects of specific Charter provisions on Aboriginal communities.' He concluded that the "Charter's impact on self-governing Aboriginal communities could have profound implications for many traditional values and customs."' 7 Our examination of the American experience has revealed that, since the Martinez decision in 1978, the main debate has been over whether the federal courts should have general jurisdiction over ICRA violations by Indian nations. In Canada, those who think the Charter does or should apply to Aboriginal governments generally appear to assume that Charter complaints against those governments could be brought in Canadian courts. This is probably because there is not any Canadian equivalent to the system of tribal courts that exists in the United States.' 7 5 However, this means that the main protection that the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the ICRA provided to Indian traditions and tribal sovereignty -namely, exclusive tribal court jurisdiction except where a writ of habeas corpus is soughtwould be missing in Canada if the Charter were to apply to Aboriginal governments. Aboriginal nations would have to depend entirely on the sensitivity of Canadian judges to safeguard their cultures against the potentially negative effects of the Charter, a situation that the U.S. Supreme Court, as we have seen, thought might "substantially interfere with a tribe's ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct entity."' ' 76 A major concern in the United States in the aftermath of Martinez has been that Indian women, especially in tribes that have not created an independent judiciary or have not waived their sovereign immunity, may be left with no remedy against gender discrimination by their tribal governments. In my opinion, we are unlikely to encounter this problem in 172 Russell, supra We have seen that the studies that have been done of tribal court enforcement of the ICRA have emphasized the need for adequate federal support and funding for tribal court systems. In Canada, where tribal courts are generally non-existent, there is a pressing need for recognition and support for Aboriginal justice systems.' 83 The American experience reveals that effective self-government involves not only the power to make and administer Aboriginal laws, but also the authority to enforce those laws within Aboriginal communities. No community can be truly self-governing as long as disputes arising within the community have to be resolved, especially at first instance, by judges who have no connection with the community and no experience with its culture and traditions. 84 The application of the Charter to Aboriginal governments is therefore related to a much larger issue, namely the extent to which Canadian courts should have jurisdiction over legal disputes arising within Aboriginal communities. It seems to me that attempting to resolve the issue of the application of the Charter without addressing this larger issue would be a serious mistake, especially if it is thought that the Charter issue can be answered with a simple yes or no.
The American experience reveals that the application of civil rights guarantees to Aboriginal governments is much more complicated than we in Canada have generally thought, and demonstrates that we should be considering a range of possible solutions rather than one simple answer. We need to have a much clearer idea of what effect the Charter might have on Aboriginal cultures and traditions. This necessitates a careful assessment of the potential impact of each of the Charter's provisions in the context of the unique cultures of the various Aboriginal nations. If application of the Charter's provisions, either in their current form or modified to take account of Aboriginal values and traditions, is determined to be appropriate, the issue of whether Canadian courts should have jurisdiction to enforce those provisions, either at first instance or by way of appeal, will need to be addressed in the broader context of Aboriginal justice systems. And nonAboriginal governments have to be prepared to provide the resources, and give Aboriginal justice systems a chance to work. All this should be done in co-operation with the Aboriginal peoples, through agreements negotiated with them. Imposition of Canadian values and norms on the Aboriginal peoples perpetuates colonialism and -as our history teaches us so wellsimply does not work.
Rsum
Le d6bat entourant l'application de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertds aux gouvemements autochtones se poursuit. Scion I'auteur, on n'a pas assez tenu compte au Canada de I'exp~rience amdricaine de l'application des droits garantis ces gouvernements. Cette exp6rience montre qu'au cours des quarante demires anndes d~cideurs politiques et juges se sont affront~s A cette question et ont tent6 de trouver un 6quilibre entre la protection des droits individuels et le respect de la souverainet6 et des traditions autochtones. A la lumire de l'exp6rience am6ricaine, il serait trop simpliste de r6pondre par un simple oui ou non A la question de l'application de la Charte aux gouvernements autochtones. I1 faudra notamment rtflchir A l'impact de la Charte sur les cultures autochtones et au r6le des tribunaux canadiens dans l'adjudication de disputes / l'int6rieur de communautds autochtones. 
